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X:}~~~~~6Abstract
Formal  retirement  income  provision  in  Australia  can  be  traced  back  to  occupational
superannuation  schemes  first  offered  by  banks  and  state  governments  in  the  19 'h centurv.
However,  the  vear 1909 marks  the  beginning  of a national  retirement  income  policy with  the
introduction  of  a  means-tested  age pension.  Since  then  retirement  income  provision  has
evolved  into  a  multi  pillar  arrangement  comprising  the  Age  Pension,  occupational
superannuation  and  other  long  term  saving  through  property,  shares  and  managed  funds.
The  1990s  saw the  introduction  of  private  mandatorv  retirement  saving  in  the  form  of  the
Superannuation  Guarantee.  With  the  introduction  of  the  Superannuation  Guarantee,
Australia  joined  a growing  group  of  countries  which  centre  their  retirement  income  policy
on pnvate  mandatory  retirement  saving.  This  paper  provides  a  succinct  description  of  the
current  system  along with  an  analysis  of  its  strengths  and  areas  where  improvement  is still
needed.
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siualuoD  jo  aqul1  Evolution  of private  mandating  of retirement  provision  in Australia
Traditionally,  Australia  relied  on  its  Age  Pension  (a universal,  but  means  tested,  benefit
pavment)  for  retirement  income  provision.  Entitlement  is  based  on  age,  residencv  status,
income,  and  assets,  but  not  on  employment  history.  It  is paid  from  general  revenues.  Tax
concessions  for voluntary  superannuation  were  first introduced  in 1915 and  strengthened  in
1936,  but  preservation  was poor  and  coverage  was low.  As recently  as the  mnid-1980s, only
30%  of  private  sector  workers  were  covered  by occupational  superannuation.
Unlike  most  other  developed  countries,  Australia  never  introduced  policies  to  compel
participation  in  a  publicly  provided  employment  or  earnings-related  retirement  income
scheme.  Prior  to  the  introduction  of  the  Superannuation  Guarantee,  Australian  retirement
income  policy  comprised  onlv  two  pillars  - the  means  tested  Age  Pension  and  voluntary
retirement  saving.
Australia's  status  as  odd  man  out  in  this  regard  seems  to  have  been  more  a  matter  of
historical  and  political  accident  than  of  any  consistent  policy  stance.  It  was  always
recognised  that  the Age Pension  alone was not  sufficient  to  fund  adequate  provision  for  the
retired  in  a developed  and  rich  society  such  as Australia's.  Between  1913 and  1938,  three
unsuccessful  attempts  were  made  to  introduce  public  earnings  related  retirement  income
(social  insurance)  arrangements  similar  to  those  which  were  proving  popular  in  Western
Europe  and  the  Americas.  In  1938  Australia  even  got  as  far  as  passing  the  enabling
legislation,  but,  with  the  coming  of  the  Second  World  War,  implementation  was  deferred
indefinitely.
Nevertheless,  occupational  superannuation  grew  rapidly  in  the  public  sector  in  the  years
following  the  Second  World  War.  But,  it was  less  common  in  the  private  sector  where  it
grew  haphazardly,  covering  some  occupations  and  not  others  and  providing  markedly
variable  conditions  and  benefits.  While  the  taxation  arrangements  were  concessionary,  the
industry  was  largely  unregulated  and  benefit  standards  were  poor.  As  a  result,  even  by the
mid  1980s,  less  than  50%  of  full time  employees  were  covered  by superannuation.  Of  this,
private  sector  coverage  was only around  30%,  and  coverage  of  full time female  workers  was
even lower  at around  25%.
4There  was  renewed  interest  in  public  earnings-related  retirement  income  provision  in  the
earlv  1970s  when  a  commissioned  studv'  also  recommended  a  scheme  along  the  lines  of
those  operating  in  most  other  OECD  countries.  However,  this  was  disregarded  bv  the
government  of  the  time  in  favour  of  greater  support  for  voluntarv  superannuation.  The
trade  union  movement  then  carried  the  push  for  earnings-related  retirement  incc me
provision  Xwith the  emphasis  moving  awav  from  publiclv  provided  to  multi-employer
occupational  arrangements.
When  a  Labor  Government  was  elected  in  March  1983,  a  major  part  of  its  econoMic
strategy  was  a continuing  contract  w-ith the  union  movement,  the  "Accord",  which  survived
through  Labor's  tenure  of  office.  The  Accord,  along  with  Australia's  then  centralised  xvage
determination  system,  contained  the  idea  of  building  superannuation  contributions  into  a
national  centralised  wage  decision.  The  idea became  reality in 1986, when  the  Accord  -ark
II  was  agreed.  A  crucial  element  in  that  agreement  was  that  while  the  increase  in
compensation  to  employees  should  be  6%,  to keep  pace  wvith  inflation,  half of  the  increase
would  accrue  in the  form  of a 3%  emplover  superannuation  contribution,  to be  paid intc, an
individual  account  in  an  industrv  fund.  This  was  known  as  productivity  aw-ard
superannuation.
The  introduction  of  productivitrv  award  superannuation  in 1986 led to  large increases  in the
coverage  of  occupational  superannuation.  Over  the  next  three  Xvears,  as individual  induscrial
award  agreements  were  negotiated  and  ratified  under  the  umbreEla of the  1986 national  w-vage
case  decision,  superannuation  coverage  increased  markedlv,  particularlv  in  the private  sector
and  in  industries  dominated  bv  women,  part  time  and  casual  workers.  In  retail  trade  an
industrv  representative  of  all of  these  groups,  coverage  grew  from  246%  in  1986  to 89° o in
1993. Aggregate  coverage  nearlv doubled  from  40%  to 79%.
However,  award  superannuation  proved  to  be  difficult  and  cosdt  to  enforce.  In  1991  the
Australian  industrial  court  rejected  an  application,  supported  bv  both  the  govemment  and
the  unions,  for  a  further  3°%o  increment.  The  govemment  responded  bv  introducing
legislation  requinrng  emplovers  to  make  superannuation  contributions  to  an  approved  ftind
The Hancock Report - see Hancock- (1976).
This  agreement  was subsequently ratified by the  nation's  industrial court,  and  survived a  Hiigh
Court challenge brought by the Confederation of Australian Industry questioning its constitutioralitv
(Dabscheck (1989), p.99)
5on  behalf of their employees.  This policy commenced in 1992 and is now known  as the
Superannuation Guarantee
Since  the  introduction  of  the  Superannuation  Guarantee,  superannuation  coverage has
continued to grow, reaching 92% of employees in 19993.
A chronology of Australian retirement policv is set out in Annex 1.
2  Current Retirement Income  Provision in Australia
Current retirement income  provision in Australia compnrses three components (or pillars).
The first pillar is a universal (but targeted) Age Pension financed from general revenues; 4 the
second pillar is the slowly maturing private mandatory provision under the Superannuation
Guarantee; and  the third  pillar is voluntary saving, including tax preferred superannuation.
The Age Pension provided under the first pillar is withdrawn where retirement income and
assets provided under  the other pillars, exceed statutory thresholds.
Two aspects of the Australian arrangements are unusual when compared with other private
mandatory arrangements. Firstly, the first pillar Age Pension operates as both the safetv net
and  the  second  pillar guarantee, and  secondly, the  first pillar is means tested against all
income and assets, rather than against private pension income only.
Each of the three pillars of retirement income provision, and the interaction between them,
is discussed below.
First Pillar Support - The Age Pension5
The Age Pension  commenced in 1909. For most of the period since that time it has served
as the social welfare safety net for the elderly and, in the absence of a compulsory earnings
related pillar, has provided a major source of retirement income for most retired people. In
3 A detailed  discussion  of the histonrcal  back-ground  can be found in Bateman  and Piggott  (1997)  and
Bateman  and Piggott  (1998).
4 The Australian  public  Age Pension  is universal  to the extent that all residents  of qualifving  age are
e]igible,  but targeted to the extent that it is subject  to income and assets  means tests.
5 In the discussion,  we ignore the distinction  between the Age Pension and the Service  Pension,
which  is paid  to  ex-servicemen  and  women.  The  two  pensions  are verv  similar, except that  the
Senrice Pension is paid five years earlier.
61998  around  83%o of  the  retired  of  eligible  age  received  some  Age  Pension  - of  which
around  680  o were paid  at the  full rate  (Centrelink  1998)6.
The  main  features  of  the Age Pension  are summarised  in Table  1.
The  Age Pension  is payable  to women  aged  61.5  years and  over,  and  to  men  aged 65  -ears
and  over 7.  Claimants  must  also  satisfy certain  residencv  qualifications.  The  Age Pension  is
means  tested  in  accordance  w%ith  either  a  person's  income  or,  assets;, xhichever  determines
the  lower  rate  of  pension.  A  higher  rate  of  pension  is pavable  to  a  single  person  than  to
each  member  of  a married  couple.  The  pension  is automatically  indexed  twice y-earlv. since
1997,  indexation  has  been  against  the  greater  of  the  growth  of  the  Consumer  Pnrce Index
(CPI)  and  male average  earnings9. Assistance  received  through  the Age Pension  is subje-t  to
personal  income  tax  but  a  pensioner  tax  rebate  is  available  which  fullyv  exempts  full-rate
pensioners  from  income  tax and  provides  partial exemption  for part-rate  pensioners.
6 Although only 10% of these rely solely on the Age Pension.
The eligibility  age for women  is being increased to age 65 by the year 2014.
s Ser-ice pensions are available to men and women 5 y'ears earlier than the Age Pension.
9 Specificallv  male total average weekly earnings.
7Table  1  Features  of the  Age  Pension
Established  1909
Eligibility  Residency
Age (males age 65,  females  age 61.5 ()
Means  tested  (income  and  assets)
Funding  General  revenues
PAYG
Amounts  Single rate  - $A9,529  pa
Married  rate  - $A7,953.40  pa
(Subject  to income  and  assets  means  tests)
Age pension  indexed  to  greater  of growth  of  CPI  and  male
average  earnings.
Other  benefits  Rent  allowance,  concessional  pharmaceutical  benefits,
public  transport,  public  utilities  etc.
Taxation  Pensioner  tax  rebate  fully exempts  full rate  age pensioners
from  income  tax, partial  exemption  for part  rate pensioners
Means  tests  Income test:
Pension  withdrawn  at  the  rate  of  50c  for  each  $A1  of
private  income  in  excess  of  a  free  area  of  $A51  per  week
(single rate), $A90 per  week  (married  rate).
Assets test:
Pension  withdrawn  by $A1.50  per  week  for  everv  $A1,000
of assets  above  thresholds:
Single  Married
Homeowner  $A127,750  $A181,500
Non  homeowner  $A219,250  $A273,000
Thresholds  and  limits indexed  to annual,  movements  in the
CPI
Part  pension  based  on  whichever  test  determnines the  lower
rate of  pension
(a)  These amounts are for Februarv 2000.
(b)  The eligibilitv  age for women was age 60. .An increase to age 65 is being implemented during
the period 1995 to 2014.
8In  Februarv  2000  the Age Pension  amounts  wvere SA9,529  pa  for single people  (around  .'5%o
average male  earnings)  and  SA7,953.40  pa  (around  20/o  average  male  earnings)  for  each  of  a
married  couple.
Recent  policv  has  reflected  an  increased  emphasis  on  targeting.  Following  a  nurmber  of
reviews  over  the  1980s  and  90s,  the  longstanding  means  testing  was  endorsed  and  the
admninistration simplified'1.
Adequac-  of  the Age Pension
The govemrnment  has legislated  to maintain  the  single rate Age Pension  at a minimum  of  250 'o
of male  average  earnings".  As retirees  solelv reliant  on  the  Age Pension  pav no  income  tax,
this  translates  to a net  of  tax replacement  rate  of  37%..io  Compared  with  other  nch  developed
countries,  these  magnitudes  are favourable  for  safetv net  payments,  but  fall far  short  of  the
payments  promised  under  typical public  emplovment  related  pension  schemes.  As  Tablepe  2
indicates,  in  1991,  Canada  was  the  only  G7  nation  with  a  higher  minimum  level  of  age
benefit  than  Australia.
Table  2  Minimum  social  security  provision  - single  older  person  - in  Australia  and
G-7 countries  in  1991, $A"
Australia  United  Canada  France  Germany  'United  It l+v
States  - Kingdom
Level of
benefits  SA880  $A6648  $A9462  SA7899  SA6201  SA6635  SA-434
Source:  Whiteford (1995).
Notes:  (a) Precise  estimates  for Japan  are not  available,  but  the mrinimumr v-alue  is below  the  G,
average. Purchasing power paritv conversions were used.
MIeans testing  has  ensured  that  a high proportion  of government  transfers  are  received  Dv the
poorest  aged,  therebv  generating  significant  redistribution  (Bateman  el al 1994).  It  h2s  also
helped  to keep  the aggregate  value of transfers  modest.
I' Simplification related to the application of the income and assets to retirement income  streams and
the  introduction  of extended  'deeming'  for financial assets. Under  'deeming', the  income  ta  be
tested  under the income  test is determined  by applying a statutorn rate of  return  to the capital
value of  financial assets.  The  1998/99  deeming  rates  are  3%  for  the  first  $A30,400 (single
retiree) /SA50,600 (couple) and 5% for the remainder.
Specificallh  male total average weeklv earnmings  Increases flow--on  to the marnred  rate.
9Second  Pillar Support  - The  Superannuation  Guarantee
The  Superannuation  Guarantee  mandates  employers  to make  superannuation  contributions
on  behalf  of  their  employees  to superannuation  funds  of  their  choice.  Employers  that  fail to
do  so  are  subject  to  the  Superannuation  Guarantee  Charge
12. The  superannuation
contributions  are  placed  in individual  accounts  in private  superannuation  funds  and invested
on  behalf  of  the  employees.  Table  3 summarises  the  main  features  of  the  Superannuation
Guarantee.
Table 3  Features of the Australian Superannuation Guarantee
Commenced  1992
Contributions  9% earnings,  paid  by employer'
Funding  Fully  funded
Individual  accounts
Many private  funds
Few investment  restrictions
Benefits  Defined  contribution
Fully vested,  portable  and preserved  to age 35 (60 by 2025)
No  early withdrawals
Choice  of  lump  sum,  pension,  annuity  with  tax/transfer
incentives  to encourage  incomre streams
Statutory  coverage  All employees  aged  18-65
Earnings  > SA450  month  (14% average  male  earnings)~b)
Self employed  not  covered
Taxation  Employer  contributions  tax deductible
Fund  income  (contributions  and  earnings)  and  benefits
taxed at concessionary  rates
Regulation  Prudent  man:  no rate of  return  or  asset requirements.
(a)  The 9% emplover contribution is being phased in over the period 1992-2002.
(b)  There  is a proposal  to  make coverage optional  for employees earning between  $A450 (14%
average male earnings) and $A900 a month (28% average male earnings).
12  The  Superannuation  Guarantee  Charge  compnrses the  shortfall  in  the  minirmum level  of
superannuation  support plus interest plus  an administrative cost component.  It costs more to pay
the  Superannuation  Guarantee  Charge than the  mandator!  contribution,  not  least because this
Charge is not a deductible business expense, unlike the Superannuation Guarantee.
10The  arrangements  apply  to  all emplovers  and  to almost  all emplovees.  Employees  earning
less  than  SA450  per  month  (around  14%  o  of  average  male  earnings)  are  specifically
excluded" 1 . The  mandatorv  contributions  are  fullv vested  (i.e. the member  is fullv entitle d  to
all  accrued  benefits),  fully preserved  (i.e. accrued  benefits  must  remain  in  a  fund  until  the
statutorv  preservation  age  for  access  to  benefits  is reached).  fullv funded  and  must  be  paid
into  a  complying  superannuation  fund."4 Boards  of  trustees  manage  the  superannuaion
funds.
The  minimum  level  of  superannuation  support  is being  phased  in,  with  the  target  of  a 9%'o
emplover  contribution  to be reached  bv 2002.
Third  Pillar Support  - Voluntarv  Retiremnent Saving
Voluntarv  retirement  saving  comprises  voluntarv  (or  quasi  voluntarn)  occupational
superannuation,  personal  superannuation  and  other  forms  of long  term  saving  through
propertr,  shares,  managed  investments  and  home-ow-nership.  Voluntarv  occupational
superannuation  accounted  for  62%  of  total  superannuation  contributions  in  1998-991'
with  430/o of  employees  making  voluntary  or personal  superannuation  contributions  at
an average  rate of  6% otf earnings.  Around  85% of  current  retirees  own  their  home.
3  Integration  of  Retirement  Income  Pillars
While  the  major  source  of  income  for most  retirees  is currentlv  the  Age  Pension,  this  will
change  over  coming  decades  as  more  Australians  reach  retirement  wvith long  period;  of
Superannuation  Guarantee  coverage.
Pnrvate Retirement  Benefits
Retirement  benefits  accumulated  under  the  Superannuation  Guarantee  and/or  voluntarv
superannuation  mav  be  taken  as  a  lump  sum  or  an  income  stream  upon  reaching  the
13  This  decision  was made largelv on  the  grounds  of  high administration costs  on  small amount
accounts.  As  well, the  government  proposes  to  make  contributions  optional  for  emplcvees
earning between 5A450 and SA900 per month (14-28% average male earnings).
14  Or  a  retirement  savings account  (RSA) offered  bv  a  financial institution.  For  public  sector
employers, a government  guarantee can  substitute for  full funding.  Defined  benefit  schemes can
count  in meeting  Superannuation  Guarantee  obligatons  provided  an  actuarial  benefit  certifizate,
specifving that  the  implicit  level  of  superannuation  support  accords  with  the  requirements,  is
obtained.
15 In  other  words  the  Superannuation  Guarantee  accounted  for  380:o of  total  superannuation
11preservation  age, currentlv  55, increasing  to age 60 over the  penrod to 2025.  Income  streams
are encouraged  bv tax and  means  test incentives,  but  it is unclear  whether  these  are affecting
the long-term  preference  for lump  sum benefits  (Bateman  eta! 1993).
Currentlv  around  75%o of  the  value  of  retirement  benefits  are  paid  as  lump  sums,  but
benefits  are  generallv  small:  the  1997  ABS  Retirement  and  Retirement  Intentions  Survev
reports  that,  in the previous  four  years, around  50%. of lump  sum retirement  payments  were
less  than  S60,000. However,  the  same  survey indicates  that  lump  sums  are largelv used  for
retirement  purposes.  Table  4,  which  sets  out  the  disbursement  of  lump  sum  payments  for
recent  retirees,  shows  that  most  superannuation  payments  are  invested,  rolled-over  or  used
to pay off  the family home.
Table  4  Disbursement  of  lump  sum  payment,  November  1997
Age  at retirement  from  full-time  work
65 and  over
(proportion  of  total lump-sum  benefits)
Rolled  over  25.9
Purchased  imrnediate  annuity  0.8
Invested  42.0
Paid off home  12.4
Bought  motor  vehicle  0.8
Cleared  outstanding  debts  5.9
Paid  for holiday  6.7
Assisted  family members  0
Undecided  1.9
Other  3.8
Source: ABS  Retirement  and  Retirement  Intentions,  Australia, November  1997, ABS  Cat  No.
6238.0. Table 12.
Because  superannuation  accumulations  do  not  have  to  be  taken  as  a  particular  type  of
income  stream,  a range  of retirement  income  stream  products  have  evolved.  There  are  three
main  categones-  superannuation  pensions,  traditional  annuities  and  allocated  pensions  or
annuities.
Superannuation  pensions  are  pensions  paid  by,  or  on  behalf  of,  superannuation  funds.
These  have  traditionally  been  paid  by  defined  benefit  schemes  in  the  public  and
corporate  sectors.
contributions.
12*  Traditional  annuities  are  offered  bv  life  insurance  companies.  Current  products  include
fixed  or  indexed  annuities  for  life  or  an  agreed  term.  In  the  12 months  to June  1998,
gross  annuitv  sales totaled  SA806million,  of which  16.6° o were  life annuities.
*  Allocated  pensions  and  allocated  annuities  (also  known  as  phased  wNithdrawals, are
offered  bv  a wide  range  of  financial  institutions.  Annual  income  payments  are reqcpred
to lie betveen  defined  minimum  and  maximum  amounts.
Product  design  and  demand  has  been  driven  bh  the  differential  tax  and  means  test
arrangements  applying  to  altemative  types  of  income  streams.  Allocated  products  (phased
'withdrawals)  have  been  the  fastest  growing  segment  of  the  market  in  recent  vears., but
changes  to  the  age pension  means  tests  in September  1998 led  to increased  demand  fo:  life
and  life expectancy  products"6.
Integration
The  Age  Pension  means  tests  do  not  distinguish  between  voluntary  and  mandatory
superannuation.  However,  they  do distinguish  between  t,pe  of  retirement  benefit.  Where  a
lump  sum  is taken  and  used  to  purchase  financial  assets,  the  capital  value  is assessed  under
the  assets  test  and  'deemed'  income  is  subject  to  the  income  test1' . WNhere  a  retirerment
income  stream  is purchased,  the  means  tests  apply  differentiallv  depending  on  the  product
type.  The  current  rules  are summnarised in Table  5.
Table  5  Retirement  income  streams  - income  and  asset  tests
Product  type  Asset  test  Income  test
Life pension!annuitv  Income  less  full  purchaset
no  price/life  expectancy  (o.-
Life expectancv  pension/annuitv  term)
Other  term  annuitv  > 5 vears  ves  Income  less  full  purchast:
price/term
Term  annuitr  <  5 vears
yes  Deeming  applies
Allocated  pension/annuirv
(phased  wI-ithdrawal)
16  In the  12  months  to June  1998, gross sales of allocated products  totalled SA4.3billion, over five
times that of traditional annuites.
A lump sum that is tak-en  and dissipated is not counted under the means tests-
13Life  and  life  expectancv  products  are  given  greatest  preference,  with  exemption  from  the
assets  test  and  preferential  income  test  treatment.  Allocated  products  (phased  withdrawals)
and short  duration  income  streams  are given  least preference.
Future  Retirement  Benefits
'With  almost  all  employees  now  covered  by  the  Superannuation  Guarantee,  manv
workers  with  additional  voluntary  superannuation  coverage  and  improvements  in
vesting,  portability  and  preservadon,  the  composition  of  retirement  income,  and
therefore  the  role  of  the  public  Age  Pension  as  the  major  source  of  income  in
retirement,  will change  in future  years.
This  is  illustrated  in  Figure  1,  which  shows  the  expected  composition  of  net  total
(public  and  private)  retirement  income  for  a  full  working  life  of  Superannuation
Guarantee  coverage.
Figure  1  Future  composition  of  retirement  benefits  (a)
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Source: Bateman and Piggott (1997), page 27.
(a) WVe  assume a single male worker on  fixed income levels between  75 per cent and  200 per
cent of male average earnings. Voluntarv saving is excluded and net of tax replacement rates are
calculated as a percentage of pre retirement expenditure.
144  Taxation  and  Regulation
W-ith the  move  towards  greater  reliance  on private  provision  for retirement,  the  related  areas
of the  taxation  and  regulation  have  also been  reformed.
Pnor  to  1983  superannuation  benefited  from  a generous  tax  treatment:  contributons  were
largely tax  deductible,  fund  earnings  were  exempt  from  tax  and  only  .% of  the  value  of  a
lump  sum,  the main  form  of  retirement  income,  was included  in taxable income.  Howcver,
there  was  little  industr-  regulation  and  the  vesting,  portabilitv  and  preservation  standairds
were poor.
Since  the  early  1980s the  taxation  of  superannuation  has  been  reshaped.  Taxation  of  lump
sum  benefits  was introduced  in  1983  and  a  tax  on  superannuation  fund  income  (including
both  contributions  and  investment  income)  in  1988.  Taxation  now  applies  at  all  three
possible  points:  contributions,  fund  earnings  and  benefits.  This  contrasts  'with  similar
arrangements  operating  elsewhere  in  the  world  which  generally  tax benefits  only. Under  the
Australian  arrangements,  employer  contributions  are  tax  deductible  (up  to  age deterrrned
limits) but  are taxed in the  hands  of  the  superannuation  fund  at a rate  of  15%.  In additicn,  a
15%°o  superannuation  surcharge  applies  to  the  contributions  of  high-income  earners.  Fund
earnings  are  taxed  at  a  statutory  rate  of  15%o,  which  is reduced  to  the  extent  that  income
accrues  in  the  form  of  dividends  or  capital  gains."'  Retirement  benefits  are  taxed  as  well,
wxith  the amount  of taxation  depending  on  the type  of benefit  and  its size.
The  1980s  also  saw  the  introduction  of  a  comprehensive  regulatorv  framework  for
superannuation.  As  the  Australian  government  does  not  have  the  constitutional  power  to
make laws  concerning  superannuation  per se, the taxation  powers  were  utilised.  Enforcement
of  the  regulations  was  tied  to  tax  concessions  provided  to  superannuation  fund;:  a
superannuation  fund  did  not  meet  the  regulatory  requirements  did  not  receive  the  tax
concessions.  An  industrv  regulator  was  established'9 and  a  set  of  operational  standards  for
the industr-  was introduced.  However,  when  the regulatorv  framework  was strengthene  i in
the  1990s greater  enforcement  powers  were  required.  This  time  the  enabling  legislation  was
enacted  under  the  Australian  govemment's  corporations  and  pensions  power,  in addition  to
s Full corporate  tax  imputation  credits  are  available on  dividend  income  wl-hich  may be  set  off
against tax on any income, including capital gains and taxable contributions, while capital gains tax  is
indexed to inflation.
l  Initially the  Insurance  and  Superannuation  Commission  and  from  Jul-  1999,  the  Austraiian
15the  taxation  power.  This  allowed  the  introduction  of  civil  and  criminal  remedies  against
trustees  who  failed in their  duties.
Prudential  issues  are largely left to superannuation  fund  trustees,  who  are  personally  liable to
fund  members  for  their  decisions.  Trustees  are  responsible  for  the  management,  operation
and  investments  of superannuation  funds.  WS7ith  the  exception  of  a 5%/o  of  asset  ceiling on in-
house  investments,  and  a  "no  borrowing"  rule,  there  are  no  asset  requirements,  nor  is a
minimum  rate  of return  required.
5  The  Superannuation  Industry  in Australia
The  main  institutions  responsible  for  private  mandatory  retirement  saving  in Australia  are
superannuation  funds 20. Superannuation  funds  operate  as trusts  and  are managed  by boards
of  trustees,  which  are  generally  required  to  include  equal  employee  and  employer
representation.  Other  institutions  such  as banks,  life  insurance  companies  and  investment
managers  have important  roles  as service providers.
There  are  five  types  of  superannuation  fund,  each  introduced  in  response  to  different
historical  and  policv  considerations.  The  public  sector  superannuation  funds  appeared  first
in  the  l 9 th  century,  followed  by  corporate  superannuation  funds  for  white-collar  workers.
Retail  funds  were  established  by  life  insurance  companies  to  promote  personal
superannuation,  while  the  introduction  of  award  superannuation  in  the  1980s  followed  by
the  Superannuation  Guarantee  in 1992 led to  the  introduction  and  rapid  growth  of industry
superannuation  funds  and  a  variant  of  retail  fund  - the  master  trust2'.  Finally,  the
mandatory  coverage  of  small  employers,  combined  with  favourable  tax  treatment  of
superannuation  has  led  to  the  introduction  and  growth  of  small  (self  managed)
superannuation  funds22.
In  December  1999  there  were  203,272  superannuation  funds  in  Australia,  comprising
200,204  'small'  and  3,576  'other'  superannuation  funds.  The  largest  100  superannuation
funds  account  for around  65% of  total superannuation  assets  (Clare and  Connor  1999).
Prudential Regulation Authoritv.
211 Since 1997 other institutions  have been allowed to offer Retirement  Savings Accounts  (RSAs) as
an alterrative.
21 WV4hich  allows non-related individuals or companies to operate superannuation  under a single trust
deed.
22  Small superannuation  funds have  5 or  less members  and  are generally established  by a  family
owned company with familh members as trustees.
16All  types  of  superannuation  fund  accept  both  mandatorv  and  voluntarv  contributions  and
anv  superannuation  fund  can  applv  to  be  established  as  an  'open'  or  public  offer  fund.
A  recent  development  has  been  the  introduction  of  retirement  savings  accounts  (RSAs),
wlhich  aim  to  provide  a low  cost  option  for  small  contributions.  RSAs  are  simple  capital
guaranteed  products  offered  bv  banks,  building  societies,  credit  unions  and  life  insura-ice
companies.  Thev  are  owned  and  controlled  bv  the  superannuation  members  holding  the
accounts  and  are  taxed  and  regulated  like  all other  superannuation  accounts.  RSAs  currentlv
account  for  less  than  1%  o of  superannuation  assets.
Assets  and  membership  of  the  five  superannuation  fund  types  and  RSAs  are  summansed  in
Table  6.
Table  6  Characteristics  of superannuation  funds,  December  1999
Tvpes  of fund  Assets  ($A billion)  No.  of funds  No.  of  accounts
,  ______________|______  (m  illions)
Corporate  74  2,746  1.389
Industrv  33  92  6.184
Retail  123  190  9.886
Public  Sector  102  40  29677
Small  Funds  59  200,204  0.439
RSAs  2. 6D9  na  Na
Annuities,  life  office  48  na  Na
reserves  etc.
All  funds  439  203,272  20.528
Source:  APRA Superannuanon Trends, December 1999.
Notes:  (a) Retirement savings accounts are included in retail funds.
In  practice,  trustees  delegate  manv  tasks  to  service  providers  including  fund  adrninistratDrs,
investment  managers,  asset  consultants,  custodians  and  other  professionals  such  as  law,ers,
actuaries  and  marketing  specialists.  Industrv  estimates  indicate  that  nearlv  86%  of  industrv
funds,  70%  of  public  sector  funds  and  around  60%iO  of  corporate  funds  use  external  find
adrninistrators.
17Superannuation  assets
There  has  been  a large increase in  superannuation  fund assets since the introduction  of
award  superannuation  and  the  Superannuation  Guarantee.  Mteasured as a  percentage  of
GDP,  total superannuation fund assets have grown from 2.8% in 1972, to 18.1%o  in 1986 to
around  70% in 1999. Government  estimates suggest that by the vear 2020, superannuation
fund assets could total around 116.5%°o  of GDP  (Tinnion and Rothman 1999).
In the absence of asset or rate of return restrictions, Australian superannuation funds tend
to  invest in a wide varietv of assets with a mix of duration and risk return characterstics.
Less  than  thirty  percent  of  assets  are  directly  invested  by  superannuation  funds:  in
December  1999 39% of assets were invested by external investment managers and 33% in
pooled  superannuation funds.
The average asset allocations of Australian superannuation funds are set out in Table 7.
Table 7  Asset  allocation of Australian superannuation funds, December  1999
Assets
$A billion
Cash and deposits  32  7
Loans and placements  20  5
Interest bearing securities  90  21
Equities and units in trusts  176  40
Direct Property  22  5
Overseas  84  19
Other  14  3
Total  439
Source:  APRA Superannuation  Trends, December  1999.
186  An Assessment  of the Superannuation  Guarantee
As Australian retirement income policv is in transition, anr  assessment of that policv I:lust
be contingent  on  the nature  of future developments.  Subject to this  caveat, however, the
Superannuation  Guarantee performs  favourably, when  assessed against standard indiv:lual
and economv wide critena for the performance of retirement income arrangements23
An assessment of the Superannuation Guarantee against the financial  risks facing individuals
in retirement is summarised in Table 8.
Table 8  Assessment  of the Superannuation Guarantee - individual criteria
Coverage Risk  *  Adequate for employees only.
Replacement Rate Risk  *  Adequate for continuous contributions.
Inv,  estment Risk  *  Bome bv retiree, but addressed through asset
diversification.
Longevitv  lRiskl L* Not covered - no mandatorv purchase of
lifetime income streams, ineffective incentives.
Inflation Risk
*  Not  covered - no mandatorv purchase of
indexed income streams, ineffective incentives.
Political Risk  *  Accumulations are insulated from political risk,
except for tax changes, but the public pension
safetv net remains exposed.
In a  strict  sense, the Superannuation  Guarantee  scores poorlv in terms of  the individual
critena, because of the lack of an income stream requirement.  In particular, longevitv and
inflation risks are not  addressed because of the  failure to require a lifetime indexed -- or
indeed any - income stream.
However,  even  if  lifetime  indexed  income  streams  were  required,  the  Superannuation
Guarantee  on its own would only partially address  mans of the financial risks faced by an
individual in retirement. In particular, the Superannuation Guarantee does not cover the self
19employed  and  income  replacement  mav  be  insufficient  for  non-standard  workers24 . As well,
while  Superannuation  Guarantee  accumulations  rest  in the  private  sector,  and  are therefore
not  part  of  the  government  budgetary  process,  thev  are  not  completelv  insulated  from
political  nsk.  It  is open  to  any  government  to  increase  tax  rates  on  accumulations  and/or
benefits  - as was  the  case  writh the  introduction  of  the  superannuation  surcharge  - or  to
make  detrimental  changes  to the regulatorv  environment.
MIanv of  these  risks  are,  of  course,  mitigated  by  the  interaction  of  the  Superannuation
Guarantee  with  the means  tested Age Pension.
Assessment  of  the  Superannuation  Guarantee  against  the  economy-wide  criteria  of
efficiency,  equity and  administrative  efficacy is summarised  in Table  9.
Table  9  Assessment  of Superannuation  Guarantee  - economy-wide  criteria
Efficiency  *  Addresses  dvnamic  inconsistency  of
preferences  and price  distortions,  by
compelling  saving
*  Does  not  address  failure  of annuities  market
Equity  *  Enhances  intergenerational  neutrality
*  Detrimental  intragenerational  impacts
- low income  earners  forced  to change
intertemporal  consumption  stream
- tax concessions  favour  high income  earners
Administrative  efficacv
*  Complex  to administer
*  Regulations  prohibit  charges  on small amount
accounts
The  Superannuation  Guarantee  is likelv to  lead to  an  improvement  in  economic  efficiency.
By compelling  retirement  saving, it addresses  myopia  and  the  intertemporal  price  distortions
ansing  from  the  income  tax  and  the  Age  Pension.  As  well,  it  is  likelv  to  improve  the
composition  of  saving bv reducing  the emphasis  on  home  ownership.  However,  by failing to
3  For a comprehensive discussion see Bateman and Piggott (1997)  and Bateman and Piggott (1998).
24  For  example, Tinnion  and  Rothman  1999 show that  a  single male  with  a  full working  life of
Superannuation Guarantee contributions out of average weeklv earnings could expect a total net-
of-tax  replacenrnt  rate  of  76%  from  private  retirement  income  plus  the  Age Pension.  This
compares with a net-of-tax replacement rate of 37% from the Age Pension alone.
20mandate  retirement  income  streams  the  Superannuation  Guarantee  does  little  to  address  the
issue of adverse  selection  in the annuities  market.
The  Superannuation  Guarantee  scores  well  on  intergenerational  equitv.  It  compels  *hose
emplovees  with  the  lifetime  resources  to  help  fund  their  own  retirement  so  would  be
expected  to  reduce  calls  on  the  means  tested  Age  Pension.  This  is  confirmed  in  Bateman
and  Ablett  (2'000) who  estimate  a  set of  generational  accounts  for Australia.  They  finc  that
the  introduction  of  the  Superannuation  Guarantee  has  halved  of  the  generational  imba.ance
in favour  of current  generations.
Within-generation  distnrbution  impacts,  however,  raise  some  concerns.  First,  if  the
Superannuation  Guarantee  is  largely  absorbed  through  slower  wage  growvth,  then  the
working  poor  mav  suffer  more  through  reduced  access to  consumption  todav  than  thev  gain
through  increased  retirement  resources  tomorrow-.  Second,  superannuation  tax  conces3;ions
offer  more  of  a  tax  break,  relative  to  the  comprehensive  income  tax,  to  the  nrch tharn the
poor.  Finally,  the  Superannuation  Guarantee  may  be  disadvantageous  to  non-standard
workers,  such  as  women  - who  have  long  penods  out  of  the  workforce,  more  part  time
work  and  lower wages  on  average  than  men.  Again,  however,  the means  tested  Age Pension
acts to reduce  these inequities23.
Due  to  the  absence  of  a  broadly  accepted  benchmark,  the  Superannuation  Guarantee's
rating  on  administrative  efficacy  is unclear.  As  a  privately  organised  and  funded  forrn  of
retirement  income  provision  it is likely  to  be  more  complex  and  more  costly  than  public
PAYG  retirement  income  provision26. But  private  provision  is likelv  to  offer  more  ch Dice,
better  governance  and  the potential  for higher  retirement  benefits.
Finally, implementation  of  the  Superannuation  Guarantee  was not  problem-free.  Of  initial
concem  were  the  relatively  high administrative  charges  placed  on  many  accounts  -with small
balances  - inevitable  in an immature  system - and  the  proliferation  of multiple  accounts'-.
The government  responded  to the  former  with regulations  limniting  the  fees charged  on  small
amount  accounts2  . The  latter is being  addressed  through  member  education  and  changes  in
23 Equity issues and the Superannuation  Guarantee are discussed in Bateman et a/ (1994).
26  However, while reported  costs data may suggest that  public arrangements are less costly, much
pubhc cost data is deficient.
- There are around three superannuation  accounts for evern work-er.
28 That  is, the member protection rules wihich require that for superannuation  accounts of  less than
21industry practice, which  have simplified procedures  for  the transfer and  amalgamation of
superannuation  accounts.  However,  an emerging  problem  is that  of 'lost'  accounts2'.
7  Current Evidence  and Projections
Preliminar.  evidence  of  the  success  of  the  superannuation  guarantee  has  focussed  primarily
on coverage  and  national  saving.
Figure  2, reports  trends  in superannuation  coverage.
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Source: Emplovment Benefits Australia, ABS No. 6334.0; Superannuation Australia, ABS
6319.0; Employee Earnings, Benefits and Trade Union Membership, ABS No. 6310.0
Since  1986  superannuation  coverage  has  increased  mark-edly for  all employees,  particularly
women.
Government  estirnates  of  the  contribution  to  saving  of  a 9%  Superannuation  Guarantee  is
set out in Table  10.
$AI,000,  fund  administration  costs  cannot  exceed  fund  earnings. Although  accounts  can  be
debited for investment losses, contributions  tax and insurance premiums.
29 The Australian Taxation Office estimates that there are about 2.5 million 'lost'  accounts and $A2.4
billion held on behalf of superannuation fund members who are 'lost' to their fund.
22Table  10 the  Superannuation  Guarantee  - contribution  to national  saving  (a)
Public  saving  Private  saving  I  National  saving
Financial  year  (contribution  as a 06 GDP)  1
1992-93  -0.03  0.D  0.4
1995-96  -0.05  0.9  0.9
1999-00  -0.18  1.4  1.2
2004-05  -0.31  2.6  2.3
2009-10  -0.37  3.2  2.8
2014-15  -0.39  3.5  3.1
2019-20  -0.35  3.9  3.6
Source: Gallagher  (1  997),  Table  1.
(a)  Estimates assume implementation  of policies announced in 1996-97  and 1997-98  Budgets,
,with no  increase in member contributions.  Various saving substitution  rates are assumed
ranging  from 5%°`  for the first  income decile  to 50%/.  for  the tenth income decile.
The  Superannuation  Guarantee  is projected  to raise national  saving by  1.29o of  GDP  bv the
cum of  the  centurv  and  bv around  3.6%  of  GDP  bv the  year 2020.  Pnrvate saving improves
because  of  the  graduallv  increasing  tax  preferred  mandatorv  contribution,  and  the  earnIngs
thereon,  net  of  saving  substiution.  However,  over  the period  to 2020, public  saving  fall:;, as
reductions  in  tax  revenue  exceed  reductions  in  Age  Pension  outlavs.  This  will,  however,
turnaround  in  later  vears  as  the  Superannuation  Guarantee  matures  and  the  retired  depend
less on the  Age Pension.
If  these  projections  are  correct,  thev  reflect  a  major  improvement  in  Australia's  saving
performance,  which  has  been  low  bv international  standards.  Net  national  saving currentlv
stands  at  around  4.5%  of  GDP,  so  a  1.2  percentage  point  increase  represents  a  :5°%
acceleration  in net  saving.
Certainlv,  the  composition  of  households'  financial  asset  saving  flows  has  altered
dramaticallv  in  the  last  decade.  Table  11 reports  the  net  acquisition  of  financial  assets  over
the past  three  decades.  Life insurance  and  superannuation  contributions  have increased  fi-om
20%o  of households'  net  acquisition  of  financial  assets  in the  1970s to 50%O  in the  1990s.
23Table  11 Households  - net acquisition of financial assets(a)
Bank  deposits  (°'o)  Life insurance,  Other,,  (9)
superannuation
contributions  (0o)
1970s  42  20  38
1980s  36  39  25
1990s  28  50  22  _
Source:  Bateman  and Piggott (1997)
Notes:  (a)  Includes  unincorporated  enterprises.
(b)  'Other' includes  building  society  and credit union deposits,  government  securities,  debenmres,
shares, unit trusts, etc.
A  final  point  on  saving  performance  concems  the  composition  of  saving  and  investment.
There  are two  main  channels of  tax preferred  saving in  Australia - superannuation,  and
ouner-occupier  housing.  The  latter  is both  treated  more  concessionally  under  the  income
tax  and  excluded  from  the  Age  Pension  means  test  so,  in  the  absence  of  compulsory
superannuation,  is  likely  to  be  chosen  as  the  preferred  personal  saving  vehicle.  The
Superannuation  Guarantee  may  therefore  contribute  more  to  the  efficient  allocation  of
economic  resources  through  its  impact  on  the  composition  of  saving  and  investment,  than
on aggregate  saving performance.
8  What problems  remain,  and how  can they  be addressed?
Four  broad  areas  of  Australia's  private  mandatory  retirement  saving  policy  remain
problematic.  These  include  integration  with  the  first  pillar  Age  Pension  and  retirement
income  streams,  taxation,  choice  and  adequacy.
Integration  wxith the  first pillar Age Pension,  and  retirement  income  streams
Perhaps  the  most  difficult  structural  problem  confronting  the  Superannuation  Guarantee  is
its linkage  with  the  first pillar - the  Age Pension  - and  the  related  question  of income  stream
choice  in retirement.30 Lump  sum  withdrawal  of  superannuation  benefits  is both  permitted
and  widespread.  This,  combined  with  the  disparity  between  the  preservation  age  for
superannuation  benefits  (currently  55, but increasing  to 60) and  the  eligibilit.  age for the  Age
30  For a  discussion of  the key public policy issues related to withdrawals from mandatory  defined
contribution  schemes, see WValliser  (2000).
24Pension  (61.5  for  females,  65  for  males),  makes  the  integration  of  the  Superannuition
Guarantee  wxith the  Age Pension  problematic.  WhiIe most  retirees  dispose  of  their  lump
sum  benefits  prudentlv,  thev  have  an  incentive  to  do  so in  ways  that  maximise  their  Age
Pension  benefits3 . This  mav involve  reduced  interest  by workers  in  maximising  invest-ment
returns  and means  test avoidance  for workers  near  the Age Pension  threshold.
While  current  policy  provides  incentives  through  the  Age Pension  means  tests  to encourage
the  takeup  of life  and  life expectancv  income  streams,  it is unclear  whether  these  incentives
wiill be effective  over  the long term.  This was shown  in Bateman  et a/ (1993) who  founc  that
the means  test and  tax incentives  did little to encourage  retirement  income  streams.
Taxation
Mluch avoidable  complexity  in  the  Australian  taxation  of  retirement  saving is introduced  bv
maintaining  three  tax  bases:  contributions,  earmings,  and  benefits.  AU  are  taxed
concessionally,  so it is less the burden  of  tax than  its  complexity,  which  is the  difficulty  here.
Hoxvever,  the  tax on  earnings  distorts  net of  tax retums,  adversely  affecting  asset  choice.  In
addition,  earnings  taxes  probablv  further  encourage  earlv  retirement,  since  it  is  ' zhen
retirement  is a viable  option  that  the  earnings  tax  bites  most  severely, reducing  the  lifetime
reward  for working  another  year. As well, contributions  and  earnings  taxes  are flat  rate  and
therefore  regressive.  The  superannuation  surcharge,  which  attempts  to  make  the
contributions  tax  on  superannuation  funds  progressive  across  fund  members,  has provtd  to
be  administrativelv  complex  and  costlv.
Further,  the  separation  of  superannuation  tax  rates  from  the  personal  tax  rate  schedule
reduces  the  political insulation  offered  by pnrvate retirement  provision  --
Choice
Choice  in the  Australian  policv debate  has  two  dimensions:  choice  of superannuation  fund  and
choice  of  investment  portfolio.  Current  policv  reform  has  emphasised  choize  of
superannuation  fund  (or retirement  saving entity),  but  support  for  it is far  from  wvidespreadi5
3' See Atkinson et al (1996).
32 For more detail on the superannuation surcharge see Bateman and Piggott (1999). For a proposal
for the simplification of superannuation  taxaticn see Dovle et a  (1999)
33 Draft  legislation has been prepared  and has been supported  by the Government  in Parliament, but
the Australian upper house, the Senate, has so far rejected the proposal  As the current draft leg slation
stands,  choice  of  fund  must  be  offered  to  all  emplovees  receiving  Superannuation  Guarantee
contributions  except for those employed under State awards. Under the draft legislation an  emplover
will be able to meet their choice of fund obligation to emplovees by electing one of the three choice of
fund models:
25There  are  arguments  for  and  against  greater  choice.  Choice  of  retirement  saving  organisation
leads to greater  marketing  to  individuals.  In  Chile (which allows emplovee  choice  of  fund)  this
has proved  expensive  "With  marketing  accounting  for around  45%  of  total  administrative  costs.
A  second  negative  relates  to  the  likely,  if  partial,  breakdown  of  group  life  insurance
arrangements.  However,  superannuation  funds  are increasingly  offering  portfolio  choice  w,ith
more  than  50%'o  of members  able to choose  their investment  portfolio.
Irrespective  of  the  choice  model  pursued,  it is vital that  members  are  well informed  and  have
access to  easily understood  comparative  performance  criteria. Therefore,  government  policv  to
facilitate  greater  investment  choice  should  be  complemented  by  appropnrate  disclosure  rules
and  effective  member  education34.
Adequacy
'W'hile govemment  estimates  suggest  that  a  9%,o  Superannuation  Guarantee  (plus  the  Age
Pension)  will deliver  an  adequate  replacement  rate  for  retirees  with  continuous  workforce
participation,  this is no  longer  the  norm3'.  As well, under  current  policy  design,  taxation  and
administrative  charges  increasingly  erode  the  mandatory  contribution.  This  raises  the  issue
of  the  adequacy  of  a  mandatory  contribution  of  9%  and  whether  the  mandatory  policy
should  be  supplemented  by incentives  to make voluntary  contributions.
*  Limnited  choice of at least 4 fund which must consist of at least one public offer fund and at least
one  RSA, and  an  industry  fund  and  an  in-house  corporate  fund  if  they  exist under  current
arrangements; or
v  Unlimnited  choice, which requires employees to nominate their preferred fund; or
*  Negotiating  a  Certified  Agreement  or  an  Austrahan  'orkplace  Agreement  covering
superannuation  between  employees  and  emplovers, or,  alternativelv, a  fund  proposed  by  an
emplovee and agreed by the emplover, in wnting.
34  These  issues  are  currently  under  consideration  following  the  release  of  the  Government
Consultation  Paper  'Financial  Products,  Service  Providers  and  MNlarkets  - an  Integrated
Framework' (Corporate  Law Econorrmic  Reform Program 1999).
35  A  proposal to  allow the splitting of accrued  superannuation benefits is being considered  by the
government - see Attorney-General's Department  (1998, 1999).
269  Conclusion
This paper has sought to explain the Australian version of private mandatorv retirement saving
- the Superannuation Guarantee - and to provide an assessment of the policv. In summary,
the Superannuation  Guarantee does well in the accumulations phase, because  the mandatory
contributions ensure that the syvstem  is fullv funded and the pnvate  basis of the policy-  helps
proVide political insulation. In the benefits phase, the policy scores poorly, because reti7ement
income streams are not mandatory.  Gi-ven  the historical right to take superannuation benefits
as lump sums in Australia, mandating retirement income streams is politically difficult.  In the
long  term,  however,  the  success of  the  Superannuation  Guarantee  will depend  up:)n  the
introduction  of such a policy.
27Annex  1: Chronology  of retirement  income  policy  in Australia
1908  Age Pension introduced
1913  Conservative parties proposed  contributorv national superannuation
1914  Introduction of tax concessions for superannuation
1922  Commonwealth employees superannuation fund established
1928  Conservative government introduced National Insurance Bill - proposed
national insurance scheme
1936  Service pension first paid. Tax concessions for lump sums introduced
1938  National Health and Pensions Insurance Bill passed - based on 1928 Bill
1943  Labour Government  establishes National Welfare Fund to fund social services
1945  Social services contribution established
1950  Social  services contribution merged with personal tax system
1969  Age Pension income test taper reduced from 1009/o  to 50%
1973  Means tests abolished for persons aged over 75
1975  Means tests abolished for persons aged 70 to 74
1976  Assets test abolished for all persons
1978  Reintroduction of assets test for persons age over 70
1983  Superannuation tax changes: lump sum taxes introduced, increased tax deductibility
for employees and the self-employed.
1984  Rollover funds established. Tax concessions for annuities introduced
1985  Asset test reintroduced  for all persons. Labor government  and trade unions finalise
Accord Mark II
1986  3% Productivitv Award  Superannuation  endorsed  by  Conciliation and  Arbitration
Commission
1987  Regulatory  framework  for  superannuation  introduced  - Occupational
Superannuation Supervision Act. Supervisory body established - the Insurance  and
Superannuation Commission
1988  Major  reforms  of  superannuation  taxation  - introduction  of  15%  tax  on
superannuation  income,  reduction  of  lump  sum  taxes,  15%  annuity  rebate
introduced,  increased tax deductibility for  uncovered  workers  and  self employed,
introduction of marginal RBL scales
281990  Age Pension means tests liberalised for pensions  and annuities. Introduction  of tax
rebates for superannuation contributions low coverage employees
1991  Industrial  relations  Corrmssion  rejects  further  3%  o  Productivitr  A,'~ard
Superannuation.  Government  announces  introduction  of  9° e  Superannuation
Guarantee to commence from Julv 1992
1992  Superannuation Guarantee commences.
1993  Superannuation Industrv Supervision Act passed.
1994  Flat rate RBLs replace marginal RBLs. Age determined employer contribution limits
introduced.  Improved  preservation.  Increased  eligibility for  5l°o annuity  re:ate.
Commencement of phase-in of preservation age of 60.
1993  Commencement of phase-in of increase in Age Pension age for women from ag-i  60
to 65. Labor government proposes to increase mandatorv contributions to 15"O.
1996  Deeming applied to financial investments under Age Pension income test.
Change of goveemment.  1996-97 Budget includes proposals to introduce RSAs,
spouse contributions,  superannuation surcharge and opt-out from Superannuatioa
Guarantee for low income earners.
1997  RSAs established and superannuation surcharge introduced. 1997-98  Budget
includes proposals to introduce emplovee choice of fund and replace previous
govemments proposed  increased mandatory contribution rate with a 15% tax rebate
for voluntarv superannuation contributions (to a max of $A3,000pa).
1998  Age Pension means tests for retirement income streams revised.
'A New Tax System' includes proposals to abolish 15% tax rebate and change Age
Pension income test taper to 40%.
1999  Govemment  announces reforms of business taxation - includes proposals to red ice
the capital gains tax rate for superannuation funds to 10% and to refund excess
imputation credits.
2000  Proposals announced in 'A New Tax Svstem', imnplemented  on 1  Julv 2000.
29References
Attorney-General's  Department  (1998), Superannuation and Family Law: A Position Paper,
Miay  1998, AGPS, Canberra.
Attomey-General's  Department  (1999), Propertv  and  Familr- Law - Options  for Change,
MIarch  1999, AGPS, Canberra.
Atkinson, NI.,  J. Creedy and D. Knox  (1996), "Alternative Retirement Income  Strategies: A
Cohort Analysis of Lifetime Redistribution", Economic  Record,  79, No. 217, pp 97-106.
Australian Bureau  of Statistics (1997), Retirement  and Retirement  Intentions,  ABS No.  6238.0,
November  1997.
Australian Bureau  of Statistics, Emplo*ee  Earnings,  Benefits  and Trade Union  Membership,  ABS
No. 6310.0 (various issues).
Australian Bureau of Statistics (1997), Superannuiation  Australia,  ABS No. 6319.0.
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Employment  Benefits-AustraIia,  ABS No. 6334.0 (various  issues).
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (1997), Superannuiation  Trends,  March 1999.
Bateman,  H.  and  Ablett,  J.  (2000),  "Compulsory  Superannuation  and  Australian
Generational Accounts", Economic  Analysis and  Poliy.
Bateman,  H.  and  Piggott, J.  (1997), Private  Pensions  in OECD  Countries:  Australia, Labour
Market and Social Policy Occasional Papers, No. 23, OECD,  Paris.
Bateman, H.  and Piggott, J.  (1998), "Mandatory Retirement Saving in Australia", Annals of
Pu,blic  and Cooperative  Economics,  69(4): 547-569.
Bateman,  H.  and  Piggott,  J.  (1999), The  Costs of the Superannuation  Surchar,e,  CEDA
Information Paper No. 65.
Bateman,  H.,  Kingston,  G.  and  Piggott,  J.  (1993), 'Taxes,  Retirement  Transfers  and
Annuities', The Economic  Record,  vol. 69, No. 206: 274-84.
Bateman, H., Kingston,  G. and  Piggott, J.  (1994), 'The Equity Implications of Mandated
Funded  Pension  Schemes', in J  Creedy (ed) Taxation,  Poverty  and Income  Distribtution,
Edward Edgar, England: 163-74.
Clare, R. and  Conner,  D.  (1999), The Sutperannuation  Market in Australia, ASFA Research
Centre, June 1999.
Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (1998), Financial  Products,  Sernice  Providers  and
AMarkets  - An  Intearated  Framework,  AGPS, Canberra.
Dabscheck  B  (1989), Aiustralian  Industrial  Relations  in the 1980s, Oxford  University Press,
Melbourne.
30Dovle,  S., Kingston,  G.  and  Piggott,  J.  (1999),  "Taxing  Super",  <ustralian Economic Retiewn,.
September  1999.
Doyle,  S., and  Piggott,  J  (1998),  "Wh-ich WN;ay  Forward?  Australia's  Policv  for  Retirement
Incomes",  Economic  Papers,  17,  7-82.
Gallagher,  P.  (1997),  Assessing  the National  Savings Effect  of the Governments Superannueation
Poliies: Some Examples of the .N\ew  RIM\IGROUTP  National Savings  Myletlhodology,  Retirement
Income  Modelling  Task  Force,  Paper  presented  to  the  Fifth  Colloquium  of
Superannuation  Researchers,  Universitv  of  Melbourne,  July 1997.
Hancock,  K.  J.  (1976),  National  Sufperannuation  Committee of Inqziii  - Final Report, -A  PS,
Canberra.
Senate  Select  Comrnittee  on  Superannuation  (1995),  Member  Investment Choice, Parliament
House,  Canberra.
Tinnion.  J. and  Rothman,  G.  (1999),  Retirement  Income -Adequacy  and the Emeraing Superann  uation
System - New  Estimates,  Retirement  Income  Modelling  Unit,  The  Treasury,  paper
presented  to  the  Seventh  Colloquium  of  Superannuation  Researchers,  University  of
Melbourne.  July 1999.
Walliser  J.  (2000),  Regulation of Withdrawals  in  Individual Account Sstems.  Social  Prote  tion
Discussion  Paper  No.  0008,  Pensions  Pnrmer  Paper.  Social Protection  Department.
World  Bank,  W  ashington  D.C.
'Whiteford,  P.  (1995),  The Use of Replacement  Rates in International  Comparisons  of Benefit Sy-tems.
Discussion  Paper  No.  54,  Social Policv  Research  Centre,  University  of  New  South
Wales.
31Social Protection Discussion Paper Series
No.  Title
0113  Regulating Private Pension Funds'  Structure, Performance and Investments:
Cross-country Evidence
by P.S. Srinivas, Edward Whitehouse and Juan Yermo
0112  The World Bank and the Provision of Assistance to Redundant Workers:
Experience with Enterprise Restructuring and Future Directions
by Yi Chen
0111  Labor Markets in Transition Economies: Recent Developments and Future
Challenges
by Mansoora Rashid and Jan Rutkowski
0110  A Review of Social Investment Fund Operations Manuals
by Juliana Weissman
0109  Risk and Vulnerability: The Forward Looking Role of Social Protection in a
Globalizing World
by Robert Holzmann
0108  Australia's Mandatory Retirement Saving Policy:  A View from the New
Millennium
by Hazel Bateman and John Piggott
0107  Annuity Markets and Benefit Design in Multipillar Pension Schemes:
Experience and Lessons from Four Latin American Countries
by Robert Palacios and Rafael Rofman
0106  Guide for Task Teams on Procurement Procedures Used in Social Funds
by Jorge A. Cavero Uriona
0105  Programmes Actifs Pour Le Marche Du Travail: Un Aper9u General Des
Evidences Resultant Des Evaluations
by Zafiris Tzannatos and Amit Dar
0104  Kazakhstan: An Ambitious Pension Reform
by Emily S. Andrews
0103  Long-term Consequences of an Innovative Redundancy-retraining Project:
The Austrian Steel Foundation
by Rudolf Winter-Ebmer
0102  Community Based Targeting Mechanisms for Social Safety Nets
by Jonathan Conning and Michael KevaneSocial Protection Discussion Paper Series continued
No.  Title
0101  Disability and Work in Poland
by Tom Hoopengardner
0024  Do Market Wages Influence Child Labor and Child Schooling?
by Jackline Wahba
0023  Including the Most Vulnerable: Social Funds and People wNith  Disabilities
by Pamela Dudzik and Dinah McLeod
0022  Promoting Good Local Governance through Social Funds and
Decentralization
by Andrew Parker and Rodrigo Serrano
0021  Creating Partnerships with Working Children and Youth
by Per Miljeteig
0020  Contractual Savings or Stock Market Development. Which Leads?
by Mario Catalan, Gregorio Impavido and Alberto R. Musalem
0019  Pension Reform and Public Information in Poland
by Agnieszka Chlon
0018  Worker Reallocation During Estonias  Transition to Market: How Efficient
and How Equitable?
by Milan Vodopivec
0017  How Poor are the Old? A Survey of Evidence from 44 Countries
by Edward Whitehouse
0016  Administrative Charges for Funded Pensions: An International Comparison
and Assessment
by Edward Whitehouse
0015  The Pension System in Argentina: Six years after the Reform
by Rafael Rofman and Buenos Aires
0014  Pension Systems in East Asia and the Pacific: Challenges and Opportunities
by Robert Holzmann, Ian W. Mac Arthur and Yvonne Sin
0013  Survey of Disability Projects. The Experience of SHIA. Swedish
International Aid for Solidarity and Humanity
by Kaj NordquistSocial Protection Discussion Paper Series continued
No.  Title
0012  The Swedish Pension Reform Model: Framework and Issues
by Edward Palmer
0011  Ratcheting Labor Standards: Regulation for continuous Improvement in the
Global Workplace
by Charles Sabel, Dara O'Rourke and Archon Fung
0010  Can Investments in Emerging Markets Help to Solve the Aging problem?
by Robert Holzmann
0009  International Patterns of Pension Provision
by Robert Palacios and Montserrat Pallares-Miralles
0008  Regulation of Withdrawals in Individual Account Systems
by Jan Walliser
0007  Disability Issues, Trends and Recommendations for the World Bank
by Robert L. Metts
0006  Social Risk Management: A New Conceptual Framework for Social
Protection and Beyond
by Robert Holzmann and Steen J0rgensen
0005  Active Labor Market Programs: Policy Issues for East Asia
by Gordon Betcherman, Amit Dar, Amy Luinstra, and Makoto Ogawa
0004  Pension Reform, Financial Literacy and Public Information: A Case Study of
the United Kingdom
by Edward Whitehouse
0003  Managing Public Pension Reserves Part I: Evidence from the International
Experience
by Augusto Iglesias and Robert J. Palacios
0002  Extending Coverage in Multi-Pillar Pension Systems: Constraints and
Hypotheses, Preliminary Evidence and Future Research Agenda
by Robert Holzmann, Truman Packard and Jose Cuesta
0001  Contribution pour une Strategie de Protection Sociale au Benin
by Maurizia Tovo and Regina BendokatSocial Protection Discussion Paper Series continued
No.  Title
* The papers below (No. 9801-9818 and 9901-9934) are no longer being printed. but are
available for dowsnload  from our website at w%vww.worldbank.org/sp
9934  Helping the Poor Manage Risk Better: The Role of Social Funds
by Steen Jorgensen and Julie Van Domelen
9933  Coordinating Poverty Alleviation Programs with Regional and Local
Governments: The Experience of the Chilean Social Fund - FOSIS
by Jorge C. Barrientos
99  32  Poverty and Disability: A Survey of the Literature
by Ann Elwan
9931  Uncertainty About Children's  Survival and Fertility: A Test Using Indian
Microdata
by Vincenzo Atella and Furio Camillo Rosati
9930  Beneficiary Assessment of Social Funds
by LawTence  F. Salmen
9929  Improving the Regulation and Supervision of Pension Funds: Are there
Lessons from the Banking Sector?
by Roberto Rocha, Richard Hinz, and Joaquin Gutierrez
9928  Notional Accounts as a Pension Reform Strategy: An Evaluation
By Richard Disney
9927  Parametric Reforms to Pay-As-You-Go Pension Systems
by Sheetal K. Chand and Albert Jaeger
9926  An Asset-Based Approach to Social Risk Management: A Conceptual
Framework
by Paul Siegel and Jeffrey Alwang
9925  Migration from the Russian North During the Transition Period
by Timothy Heleniak
9924  Pension Plans and Retirement Incentives
by Richard Disney and Edward Whitehouse
9923  Shaping Pension Reform in Poland: Security Through Diversity
by Agnieszka Chlon, Marek G6ra and Michal RutkowskiSocial Protection Discussion Paper Series continued
No.  Title
9922  Latvian Pension Reform
by Louise Fox and Edward Palmer
9921  OECD Public Pension Programmes in Crisis: An Evaluation of the Reform
Options
by Richard Disney
9920  A Social Protection Strategy for Togo
by Regina Bendokat and Amit Dar
9919  The Pension System in Singapore
by Mukul G. Asher
9918  Labor Markets and Poverty in Bulgaria
by Jan J. Rutkowski
9917  Taking Stock of Pension Reforms Around the World
by Anita M. Schwarz and Asli Demirguc-Kunt
9916  Child Labor and Schooling in Africa: A Comparative Study
by Sudharshan Canagarajah and Helena Skyt Nielsen
9915  Evaluating the Impact of Active Labor Programrs:  Results of Cross Country
Studies in Europe and Central Asia
by David H. Fretwell, Jacob Benus, and Christopher J. O'Leary
9914  Safety Nets in Transition Economies: Toward a Reform Strategy
by Emily S. Andrews and Dena Ringold
9913  Public Service Employment: A Review of Programs in Selected OECD
Countries and Transition Economies
by Sandra Wilson and David Fretwell
9912  The Role of NPOs in Policies to Combat Social Exclusion
by Christoph Badelt
9911  Unemployment and Unemployment Protection in Three Groups of Countries
by Wayne Vroman
9910  The Tax Treatment of Funded Pensions
by Edward WhitehouseSocial Protection Discussion Paper Series continued
No.  Title
9909  Russia's Social Protection Malaise: Key Reform Priorities as a Response to
the Present Crisis
edited by Michal Rutkowski
9908  Causalities Between Social Capital and Social Funds
by Jesper Kammersgaard
9907  Collecting and Transferring Pension Contributions
by Rafael Rofman and Gustavo Demarco
9906  Optimal Unemployment Insurance: A Guide to the Literature
by Edi Karni
9905  The Effects of Legislative Change on Female Labour Supply: Marriag  and
Divorce, Child and Spousal Support, Property Division and Pension Splitting
by Antony Dnes
9904  Social Protection as Social Risk Management: Conceptual Underpinnings for
the Social Protection Sector Strategy Paper
by Robert Holzmann and Steen Jorgensen
9903  A Bundle of Joy or an Expensive Luxury: A Comparative Analysis of the
Economic Environment for Family Formation in Westem Europe
by Pierella Paci
9902  World Bank Lending for Labor Markets: 1991 to 1998
by Amit Dar and Zafiris Tzannatos
9901  Active Labor Market Programs: A Review of the Evidence from Evaluations
by Amit Dar and Zafiris Tzannatos
9818  Child Labor and School Enrollment in Thailand in the 1990s
By Zafiris Tzannatos
9817  Supervising Mandatory Funded Pension Systems: Issues and Challenges
by Gustavo Demarco and Rafael Rofman
9816  Getting an Earful: A Review of Beneficiary Assessments of Social Furds
by Daniel Owen and Julie Van Domelen
9815  This paper has been revised, see Discussion Paper No. 9923Social Protection Discussion Paper Series continued
No.  Title
9814  Family Allowances
by Suzanne Roddis and Zafiris Tzannatos
9813  Unemployment Benefits
by Zafiris Tzannatos and Suzanne Roddis
9812  The Role of Choice in the Transition to a Funded Pension System
by Robert Palacios and Edward Whitehouse
9811  An Alternative Technical Education System: A Case Study of Mexico
by Kye Woo Lee
9810  Pension Reform in Britain
by Edward Whitehouse
9809  Financing the Transition to Multipillar
by Robert Holzmann
9808  Women and Labor Market Changes in the Global Economy: Growth Helps,
Inequalities Hurt and Public Policy Matters
by Zafiris Tzannatos
9807  The World Bank Approach to Pension Reform -
by Robert Holzmann
9806  Government Guarantees on Pension Fund Returns
by George Pennacchi
9805  The Hungarian Pension System in Transition
by Robert Palacios and Roberto Rocha
9804  Risks in Pensions and Annuities: Efficient Designs
by Salvador Valdes-Prieto
9803  Building an Environment for Pension Reform in Developing Countries
by Olivia S. Mitchell
9802  Export Processing Zones: A Review in Need of Update
by Takayoshi Kusago and Zafiris Tzannatos
9801  World Bank Lending for Labor Markets: 1991 to 1996
by Amit Dar and Zafiris TzannatosSummary  Findings
Formal retirement income provision in Australia can he traced back to
occupational superannuation schemes  first offerecd  hy banks and state
governments  in the 1  9th century. However, the year 1909 marks  the
beginning of a national retirement income policy with the introduction of
a means-tested  age pension. Since  then retirement income provision has
evolved into a multi pillar arrangement  comprising the Age Pension,
occupational superannuation  and other long  term saving  through property,
shares  and managed  funcis.  The 1  990s saw the introcluction ot private
mandatory  retirement  saving  in the form of the Superannuation  Guarantee.
With the introduction of the Superannuation  Guarantee,  Australia  joined
a growing group of countries which centre their retirement income policy
on private mandatory retirement  saving.  This paper provides a succinct
description of the current system  along with an analvsis  of its strengths
and areas  where improvement is still needed.
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engaged in the design and implementation of pension reforms around the world. Policymakers and
those who advise  them will  find  useful information on other reform experiences,  the current thinking
of pension specialists  and a vast  array of cross-country  evidence.  A flexible and dynamic format ensure
that key developments are updated  as they occur.
The  World Bank  set  out a conceptual  framework  for fundamental  pension  reform  in Averting  the Old
Age  Crisis:  Policies  to Protect  the Old and  Promote  Growth.  This  study,  published  in 1994,  helped  shape
the  global  debate  about  the impact  of  population  ageing  on pension  systems.  The  Pension  Reform  Primer
builds on this pioneering work and on the experience of the World Bank and other international
institutions in the last five years. It focuses  on practical questions.
For  more  information,  please  contact  Social  Protection,  Human  Development  Network,  World Bank,
1818  H Street  NW,  Washington,  D.C.  20433;  telephone  +1202  458 5267;  fax  +1 202  614  0471,  e-mail
socialprotection@worldbank.org.  All Pension  Reform  Primer  material  is  available  on the internet  at
www.worldbank.org/pensions